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Self-modification is an ancient human practice; 
however, for the first time in history, technology is 
enabling us to modify our lives not only at an 
existential or experiential level, but also at an 
informational level. This paper discusses Foucault’s 
concept of “technologies of the self” as well as some 
of its recent interpretations within contemporary 
philosophy of technology. It shows how ICTs have 
opened new dimensions for humans to transform 
their bodies, minds, and self-conception. It argues 
that while ‘traditional’ self-modification is being 
revolutionised and popularised by ICTs, these 
systems are also exposing us to potent, and 
unintentional forms of ontological tinkering. 
Ultimately, this paper shows how Foucault’s concept 
can serve as a valuable tool for understanding 
contemporary human-technology relations. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
The impact of current technological changes over 
human self-understanding has come to the fore in 
recent years, particularly given our ever-increasing 
interaction with virtual worlds, new forms of 
biotechnology, and the potential emergence of strong 
artificial intelligence (AI). Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) are already 
altering the contexts and practices through which 
people—particularly the young—shape their personal 
identities, and hence, the ways they relate to their 
groups, societies, cultures, and environments (Floridi, 
2011a; 2014). Yet, as radical as these changes are, 
artificial self-modification is by no means a new 
phenomenon, since humans have been doing it for 
millennia. What the ongoing technological shifts are 
transforming is the availability, range of action, and 
power of our self-modification tools. In so doing, they 
are making evident that human practices and 
technologies have always formed complex 
sociotechnical systems and, therefore, that a clear 
distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ 
phenomena in human contexts is, at best, illusory. 
However, whereas these notions are by now 
generally accepted throughout new branches of 
philosophy, science, and engineering, they have only 
recently begun to permeate art scholarship. Here, the 
aforementioned natural vs. artificial distinction along 
with the subject vs. object dichotomy continues to 




creative practitioners) think about human-technology 
relations. Dispelling the idea that technological 
systems and human beings can somehow be 
analysed independently from each other is a crucial 
step towards developing a much-needed 
contemporary humanistic critique of how 
technologies are shaping our sense of self. 
Human self-modification tends to be portrayed—
particularly within transhumanist literature (e.g. see 
More & Vita-More, 2013)—as a relatively novel 
phenomenon that emerged as a consequence of the 
ongoing information revolution. Conversely, 
posthumanist accounts, particularly those associated 
with postphenomenology (Ihde, 2009; Rosenberger & 
Verbeek, 2015) and Actor–Network-theory (Latour, 
2014), contend that human experience and 
understanding of the world have been, from the 
outset, invariably mediated by technology (Kiran, 
2015; Latour, 1994) —hence implying that 
technological self-transformation has always been a 
central aspect of human culture. That human beings 
have since ancient times resorted to artificial means 
to enhance their minds and bodies was also 
recognised by Michel Foucault (1988), who dubbed 
such practices “technologies of the self”. In the 
decades since Foucault’s death, this concept has 
been recovered, reinterpreted, and expanded by new 
strains of philosophy of technology (Bakardjieva & 
Gaden, 2011; Dorrestijn, 2012; Sharon, 2014; 
Verbeek, 2011), media philosophy (Gualeni, 2015), 
and philosophy of information (Floridi, 2011b). 
This paper discusses Foucault’s original concept as 
well as some of its contemporary reinterpretations. 
Yet, it does so not to clarify its place within 
Foucauldian theory, nor to critically examine ICTs in 
light of his genealogical method. Rather, its aim is to 
show that, to a certain degree, all sociotechnical 
systems contribute to shape human self-
understanding, and that recent developments in ICTs 
have significantly expanded the power and 
availability of our self-modifying tools. Enlisting the 
help of recent insights from philosophy of technology 
and philosophy of information, this paper argues that 
ICTs are exposing us to potent, inconspicuous forms 
of ontological tinkering [1], sometimes without us 
being aware of it. It contends that a growing number 
of aspects in our life, particularly the development of 
our social selves—and hence of our self-
understanding—have effectively become poietic 
practices; that is, matters of design. 
2 | WHY WE SHOULD THINK DIFFERENTLY 
ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 
Over the last decades, a series of technological shifts 
largely triggered by the information revolution has 
deeply transformed human life. Ubiquitous 
computing, digital modelling and fabrication, machine 
learning and robotics, mixed and virtual reality, and 
recent advances in biotechnology such as CRISPR 
[2] are allowing us for the first time in history to design 
our lives not only in existential terms, but also at 
phenomenological, and biological levels (Gualeni, 
2015). By enabling us to engineer and share 
experiences while spending greater amounts of time 
in different possible worlds (Gualeni, 2015) or 
“manifest worlds” (Feyerabend, 1996, p. 27), ICTs are 
effectively blurring the distinction between our offline 
and online environments (Floridi, 2011a). And by 
merging our virtual and physical worlds, they are thus 
not only enhancing but re-engineering reality itself 
(Floridi, 2010). By allowing us to create multiple 
personas, ICTs are deeply transforming how we 
present ourselves to ourselves and to the world, and 
therefore how we develop our personal identities. 
As more aspects of our life become mediated by and 
dependent upon technological systems and as our 
relations with our appliances (e.g. smartphones) grow 
more intimate, the (traditional) distinction between 
“natural” and “artificial” human phenomena becomes 
more difficult to uphold. As more artificially “a-live” 
(see Floridi, 2007) agents join the nascent internet of 
things (IoT) and the potential emergence of strong 
artificial intelligence (AI) looms [3], what it means to 
be human and what distinguishes us from other 
entities in the world become widely contested notions. 
In other words, the validity of the subject vs. object 
distinction and the prevalence of modernist 
(anthropocentric) humanism has stopped being taken 
for granted, or, to borrow Latour’s (2005) formulation, 
they have turned from “matters of fact” into “matters 
of concern”. 
In the context of critical theory, a field with a strong 
influence over art scholarship, technological systems 
continue to be regarded as limiting autonomous 
forces that constrain, rather than enrich, human 
action. This, regardless of the fact that an ever-
increasing number of creative practitioners is 
exploring new aesthetic horizons opened by ICTs by 
tinkering with data, digital fabrication, or novel 
approaches to human-computer interaction (HCI). 
However, as Ratto (2011) suggests, a disconnect 
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between the way technologies are conceptualised 
and the ways they are employed and experienced still 
prevents many art scholars from treating 
sociotechnical systems as “matters of concern” [4]. 
Consequently, technologies continue to be conceived 
as phenomena that are intrinsically distinct or even 
antithetical to human nature, as things that evolve in 
parallel rather that in an intertwined manner with 
human societies. While posthumanist and 
transhumanist views have certainly gained popularity 
within art scholarship, in practice little reflection is 
done on the necessarily artificial—and thus 
technological—origin of many aspects of human life, 
including art itself. 
3 | A THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
In an essay published four years after his death, 
Michel Foucault (1988) detailed the origins and 
purpose of certain methods employed in classical 
antiquity and through Christendom by individuals who 
sought to transform (and enhance) their conducts, 
bodies, and minds. These “technologies of the self”, 
were not instruments or appliances in the 
contemporary (material) sense but rather practices or 
“existential tools” (Verbeek, 2011). While it is perhaps 
not one of the most well-known items in the 
Foucauldian toolkit, over the last years this notion has 
re-emerged in current analyses of ICTs. Although 
Foucault is not generally regarded as a philosopher 
of technology, as we will see in the next section, 
several of the points he makes in Technologies of the 
Self coincide with contemporary views on 
technological systems (Dorrestijn, 2012; Verbeek, 
2011). 
The origins of Foucault’s concept are to be found in a 
seminar he presided at the University of Vermont in 
1982, the results of which were compiled and 
published a few years after his death. At the time, 
Foucault had embarked on a new line of enquiry that 
focused on the processes whereby humans 
“constitute[d] themselves as subjects” (Foucault, 
1988). He had grown more interested in 
understanding how individuals historically sought to 
gain knowledge of themselves through dedicated 
epistemic systems and practices, and then use the 
resulting insights to control and modify their 
behaviour, and (ultimately) their self-identity. This 
project, according to Martin, Gutman, & Hutton 
(1988), represented the “logical conclusion” of 
Foucault’s previous research on the nature of power 
and its dynamics in sexuality, mental health, and 
penology. 
In his essay, Foucault identified four “major types” of 
“technologies” (1988, p. 18), although he conceded 
that neither of them could actually be found working 
in isolation. These were (a) technologies of 
production, (b) technologies of sign systems, (c) 
technologies of power and finally, (d) technologies of 
the self; the latter of which: 
[P]ermit individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, 
so as to transform themselves in order to 
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, 
1988, p. 18) 
Depending on the historical setting, these practices 
could involve (but were not limited to): sexual 
explorations or abstinence; fasting and other dietary 
restrictions; physical and intellectual exercises; 
praying and meditation; journaling and epistolary 
exchanges; and what Adler and Doren (2006/1940) 
would call “syntopical reading”. Seeing Foucault’s 
definition, it seems as if “reading moral tales would be 
as good a match as body piercing or tattooing” 
(Bakardjieva & Gaden, 2011, p. 401). 
Foucault understood these techniques as forms of 
“individual domination” (1988, p. 19), as the means 
through which people exerted power to control 
themselves; albeit for fundamentally ethical reasons. 
He traced some of these "operations" to ancient 
Greek and Rome, wherein certain individuals saw the 
practice of “caring for themselves” as a personal and 
collective duty. To these people, Foucault contended, 
“occupying themselves with themselves” and striving 
for personal self-improvement ultimately implied 
taking care of their cities. 
With the rise of Christianity, however, the ethical root 
of self-actualisation became obscured and 
transformed. The original principle of “taking care of 
oneself” came to be seen as a form of selfish 
immorality and was gradually replaced with the more 
pious principle of “knowing oneself” (Foucault, 1988, 
pp. 19–20); which, in turn, became the “prerequisite 
for self-denunciation” (Bakardjieva & Gaden, 2011, p. 
402). Self-actualisation thus morphed into self-




responsibility gave way to the new religious obligation 
of submitting one’s body and soul to the power of 
divine will. 
3.1 SITUATING FOUCAULT WITHIN CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 
‘Classical’ philosophers of technology such as Ernst 
Kaap, Martin Heidegger and José Ortega y Gasset 
(see Mitcham, 1994) were among the first to 
recognise that technical appliances shape our daily 
understanding of the world. Or, as Nietzsche once 
noted, that “our tools also affect our thoughts” (cited 
by Kittler, 1999). But apart from Kapp, who did not 
endorse the dialectical opposition between the 
natural and the artificial worlds and conceived 
technologies primarily as extensions of human 
capacities (Gualeni, 2015), the majority of these early 
thinkers portrayed technology in abstract, monolithic, 
and pessimistic terms. Heidegger (1977/1954), the 
most influential of them all, portrayed technology (and 
“Western metaphysics”) as a limiting, utilitarian force 
which prevented human beings from experiencing the 
world in alternative (e.g. Pre-Socratic) ways. 
However, in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
philosophy of technology underwent a so-called 
“empirical turn” (Achterhuis, 2001; Ihde, 2009), as a 
new generation of scholars began to question their 
predecessor’s treatment of technology as a 
monolithic, autonomous, and largely nefarious force. 
Emphasising “technical mediation” (Dorrestijn, 2012; 
Kiran, 2015; Latour, 1994), contemporary 
philosophers of technology, in particular those 
identified with Actor-Network Theory [5] (ANT) and 
postphenomenology [6] contend technology “co-
evolves” with society (Ihde, 2009). They thus 
conceive technology as a modular network of 
systems, which can only be analysed and understood 
by observing their role within specific human 
practices [7]. 
Philosopher Peter-Paul Verbeek suggests that in 
Foucault’s analyses power plays a comparable (albeit 
slightly different) role than the one technology played 
in Heidegger’s work: that is, being that which 
ultimately structures society and culture (2011, p. 68). 
Heidegger and his contemporaries contended that 
the essence of technology had less to do with tools, 
instruments, and machinery than with a particular 
(utilitarian) mindset or “attitude” that pervaded every 
aspect of human life (Mitcham, 1994). When talking 
about technology, Foucault too was not referring to 
physical instruments; this is evident in the following 
clarification: 
[W]hat interests me more is to focus on what 
the Greeks called the technê, that is to say, a 
practical rationality governed by a conscious 
goal…. The disadvantage of this word technê, 
I realize, is the relation to the word 
“technology”, […] A very narrow meaning is 
given to “technology”: one thinks of hard 
technology, the technology of wood, of fire, of 
electricity. Whereas government is also a 
function of technology: the government of 
individuals, the government of souls, the 
government of the self by the self, the 
government of families, the government of 
children, and so on. (Foucault, 1982/2001, p. 
364) 
Besides nodding to the Promethean myth as 
recounted by Plato, Foucault did not seem to endorse 
a fundamental distinction between human and 
technical dimensions. The way he describes 
technological influence does not necessarily imply a 
de facto negation of human agency and freedom (see 
Dorrestijn, 2012). For Foucault it seems clear that, as 
is the case with power dynamics, our engagements 
with technology do not happen in a vacuum, but 
against a messy and shifting backdrop of objects, 
institutions, and human relations. That is precisely 
why Verbeek (2011, pp. 67-68) contends that 
Foucault’s stance is compatible with contemporary 
philosophy of technology. 
During Foucault’s lifetime—and apart from the 
emergence of recording and communication systems 
such as photography, video, and audio— the 
available “technologies of the self” continued to be 
roughly the same as those people had been using for 
millennia: procedures and behaviours; methods that 
required little or no direct action from material 
instruments. Yet, three decades after Foucault’s 
essay was published the circumstances have 
changed, as most regions of the world have fully 
embraced the so-called information society, 
instruments that enable, accelerate, and deepen self-
modification have become pervasive. Unlike the 
procedures Foucault described, these are 
technological systems in the “material” sense, and 
also with the capacity to influence self-transformation 
either by design or as a side effect. The following 
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section discusses two interpretations of this shift and 
its implications. 
4 | EXPANDING FOUCAULT’S IDEAS 
In a recently published book, philosopher and video 
game designer Stefano Gualeni (2015) shows how, 
by allowing us to access and interact with virtual 
worlds, ICTs can disclose “new human kinds of 
ontologies” [8]. Gualeni’s analysis is framed by 
postphenomenology and media theory; he endorses 
the notion that humans are “artificial by nature”, and 
regards technologies as a powerful but not definitive 
factor in cultural change due to their “inherent” 
capacity to extend our perceptual, intellectual, and 
operational abilities (2015, p. 73). He suggests that 
technological development can function as a vehicle 
for collective and individual self-expression; as a 
medium for humans to objectify their “worldviews, 
needs, and aspirations”. Therefore, technologies 
have the potential to disclose “specific forms of self-
reflection and self-discovery” (2015, p. 73). Like most 
philosophers in the postphenomenological tradition, 
Gualeni regards technological instruments primarily 
as mediators; as systems that shape the ways we 
make sense of the world and hence, of our own 
selves [9]. 
Gualeni reframes Foucault’s notion of “technologies 
of the self” in terms of transformative practices 
conceived to elicit some type of long-term (and long-
lasting) transformative experience [10]. He also 
reminds us that the ethical principle which, according 
to Foucault, motivated self-improvement practices in 
ancient Greece was more “projectual” than 
normative. Thus, the guiding question for the Greek 
citizen was not “’How should I act to be a moral 
subject’ but rather ‘What kind of subject do I want to 
be’” (2015, p. 74). In summary, people engaged in 
self-transformation were not merely following an 
ethical dictum, but engaging in a poietic enterprise of 
“self-design”. It is precisely this creative aspect that 
Gualeni finds most appealing in Foucault’s concept. 
Gualeni likens the process of “self-refashioning”, 
which Foucault characterised as a form of self-
imposed power, to the way artists exercise power 
over their materials to produce an artwork (2015, p. 
75). He suggests that creative projects (e.g., writing 
philosophical treatises or literary pieces, or designing 
virtual worlds) can also lead to highly transformative 
aesthetic and existential experiences, not only for the 
audience but for their creators too. And while video 
game design is already widely recognised as an 
activity driven by a “creative urge”, Gualeni contends 
the poietic nature of this practice can be exploited for 
epistemic purposes. He thus notes that virtual world 
development may be regarded as a self-gnostic 
method through which designers can “realize their 
own beliefs and behaviour, and hence perform ethical 
and aesthetic self-fashioning” (2015, p. 76). 
As for the wider cultural impact of current 
technological developments, Gualeni acknowledges 
the ubiquity of ICTs—and hence, of virtual worlds—is 
pushing our ontological frameworks into an 
increasingly “technically-mediated” context. This 
shift, he argues, has important consequences for the 
way humans understand and categorise their 
relationships with the world and with themselves. 
People are now able to “design their lives” not only in 
the “existential” sense (that Foucault described) but, 
increasingly, in “biological” (i.e., anatomical, genetic, 
physiological) and experiential terms (2015, p. 72). As 
a result, ICTs “allow human beings to objectify and 
overcome some of the phenomenological, 
operational, and ontological boundaries that 
characterize pre-digital thinking” (2015, p. 71). 
Through our daily interaction with these technologies, 
our traditional (modern) ontologies establish “a 
reciprocally influential relationship” with digital 
simulations and hence fragment and extend into 
formerly inaccessible worlds (2015, p. 72). 
However, irrespectively of how profound these shifts 
might seem, Gualeni contends they are far from being 
truly radical, for they do not necessarily imply a true 
break with pre-digital human kinds of ontologies. 
Gualeni’s main point is that virtual worlds are but 
idealisations of existing (actual or imaginary) 
interpretations of reality, and thus they can only offer 
alternative ways of understanding time, space, 
physical properties and causality. It follows that 
irrespectively of how otherworldly a given digital 
simulation might appear, at the most basic level it is 
only a reformulation, a simple alteration, a reversal, 
or a recombination of existing ontologies. Secondly, 
Gualeni notes that human conception of the world is 
unavoidably constrained by our biology. This implies 
that every one of our constructs, whether imaginary 
or concrete, is ultimately a product of one or more 
human subjectivities. Finally, Gualeni argues digital 
simulations are necessarily filtered by the ontological 
architecture of computational technology, which itself 




rationality. In summary, Gualeni claims that while 
ICTs can expand and reshuffle our conception of 
reality and of what it means to be human, it is unlikely 
they could ever allow us to completely transcend our 
human condition as transhumanist accounts often 
suggest. 
4.1 PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION: ENVELOPMENT 
AND THE INFOSPHERE 
Philosopher Luciano Floridi, one of the founders and 
leading proponents of (a constructionist) philosophy 
of information [11], warns that expecting questions to 
be solved by a “single, correct, absolute answer, 
independently of context, purpose, and perspective” 
(2014, p. 67) is illusory. Problems are always 
addressed from a given perspective or “interface"; 
this implies making certain assumptions, and 
compromises about the problem, its components, 
and its potential solution. Thus, to ask how ICTs are 
affecting human self-understanding implies at the 
very least to ask for a specification of what “the self” 
represents, what ICTs are, and how they operate. 
Since Floridi endorses “informational realism”; i.e., 
the belief that “as far as we can tell, the ultimate 
nature of reality is informational” (2011c, p. 361), he 
contends that “deep down” the nature of brains and 
bodies, and of minds and selves is also informational. 
That is to say, all of these things may be regarded as 
“different states of information, or different 
informational patterns” (2014, p. 71). Thus, Floridi 
characterises the self as a “complex informational 
system, made of consciousness, activities, 
memories, or narratives” (2014, p. 69). 
Given the former criteria and that, by definition ICTs 
are any technology capable of manipulating 
information, Floridi argues that ICTs “are the most 
powerful technologies to which selves have ever 
been exposed” (2011b, p. 561). In the philosophy of 
mind, Floridi notes, there is a well-established 
distinction between personal identities (i.e. who we 
are) and our self-conceptions (i.e., who we think we 
are). In healthy circumstances, both poles reinforce 
each other. However, our self-conception is 
significantly flexible and can be affected by both the 
feedback we receive from other agents and by our 
own idealisations; this is the “social self” (2014, p. 60). 
Now, the reason why ICTs can influence and shape 
“who we are, who we think we are, who we might 
become, and who we think we might become” 
(2011b, p. 550), and they do so mainly by changing 
our social selves. 
In an age where more and more people frequently 
use online platforms to broadcast opinions, tastes, 
intimate details and experiences, social selves, and 
therefore personal identities have become malleable 
to an unprecedented degree. If the social conditions 
of someone’s life are changed, if her network of 
relations and the type and frequency of information 
she is exposed to shifts, then the way she presents 
herself to the world is inevitably changed as well. This 
projection reflects back onto her social self, 
modulating her self-conception and therefore her 
personal identity (Floridi, 2014, p. 61). 
ICTs can also meddle with our memories; and 
memory, as Floridi notes, “plays a crucial role in the 
construction of personal identity” (2011b, p. 562). 
Along with communication, one of the core functions 
of ICTs, and arguably their original function, is storing 
information. Throughout much of human history, 
external memory was only available to those few with 
the means to read and write. That changed first with 
global literacy and, later, with the emergence of 
analogue and electronic “media” (i.e., non-text based 
ICTs such as image and audio recording systems), 
and the internet. Through the various platforms and 
services that allow us to accumulate, upload and 
share an ever-growing flow of memories in all sorts of 
data formats, we are granting ICTs unprecedented 
power to influence us back. As Floridi notes, until 
recently, the relation between ICTs and the 
construction of personal identities online had been 
regarded in rather optimistic terms; it was believed 
that these technologies would mostly empower 
individuals by granting them more freedom to choose 
who they wanted to be (2014, p. 72). This account is 
now more nuanced as it is clearer “the more 
memories we accumulate and externalise, the more 
narrative constraints we provide for the construction 
and development of personal identities” (2011b, p. 
562). In fact, by increasing, objectifying, publicising, 
and fixating our memories online we are actually 
constraining our ability to define (and redefine) 
ourselves. For whereas the process of “forgetting is 
also a self-poietic art” (2011b, p. 262), the Internet 
never “forgets”. 
Floridi also contends that ICTs are not only modifying 
our mental self, but our relationship with our bodies 
too. Telepresence magnifies the distinction between 
physical presence and location that our written 
language inaugurated [12]. Who we are increasingly 
means who we are online. Human relations can now 
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happen exclusively through digital mediation. And 
because the internet does not forget, our virtual 
selves can become “chronologically misaligned”, 
since digital avatars may outdate but they do not grow 
old. Furthermore, as ICTs merge with more 
sophisticated imaging and visualisation systems [13], 
we acquire the ability to “measure, model, simulate, 
monitor, and manage our bodies ever more deeply, 
accurately, and non invasively” (2014, p. 77). Our 
bodies, to use a programming metaphor, are rapidly 
becoming white, and even transparent, boxes —at 
least in visual terms. 
While a many of the changes brought by ICTs involve 
some form of virtual environment, our physical world 
is also being reshaped. Over the last half century, 
thanks to the growth and development of 
computational technology, our informational 
environment or “infosphere” [14] (Floridi 2010) has 
been expanding. Meaning that not just 
communications and entertainment, but every other 
aspect of human life, such as social interactions, 
businesses, education, transportation, healthcare, 
governance, law enforcement, etc., is being 
integrated into our digital environment. The 
infosphere is rapidly becoming our default habitat: the 
world where we live in. Hence, our conception of 
reality is becoming increasingly more dependent on 
informational frameworks and tools. 
However, instead of fitting our technologies to the 
preexisting limits of our world, we are instead 
adapting both our environment and ourselves to our 
ICTs [15]. Our technologies are educating us as 
users. This integration involves a greater 
“envelopment” [16] of our physical world (Floridi, 
2012). Envelopment, Floridi argues, “used to be 
either a stand-alone phenomenon” (e.g., a 
dishwasher, which is a machine built around an 
enveloped “micro-environment”) or one constrained 
to a particular space (a car factory filled with hundreds 
of robots). However, the ubiquity of cell sites (cell 
towers) and Wi-Fi hotspots has enveloped and 
transformed our physical environment, making it a 
more technology-friendly place where our also 
ubiquitous smart devices can gather, transmit, and 
process vast amounts of data on a permanent basis 
(2012, p. 252). Thus, in the words of Floridi: 
Enveloping is a trend that is robust, 
cumulative, and progressively refining: 
everyday sees the availability of more tags, 
more humans online, more documents, more 
statistical tools, more devices that 
communicate with each other, more sensors, 
more RFID tags, more satellites, more 
actuators, more data collected on all possible 
transitions of any system, in a word, more 
enveloping. (Floridi, 2012, p. 252) 
This is what has allowed purely syntactical and, 
hence, semantically incompetent systems to become 
so powerful as to be considered “smart”. 
Enveloping is closely tied with another fundamental 
change triggered by ICTs, which Floridi calls “re-
ontologising”. He claims that by adapting ourselves 
to—and making sense of our world through—
information technology we are contributing to “a very 
radical form of re-engineering […] that not only 
designs, constructs or structures a system […] but 
that fundamentally transforms its intrinsic nature” 
(2012, p. 251). ICTs grant us access to ever more 
sophisticated alternative worlds, this in turn implies a 
shift from a materialist (Newtonian) understanding of 
reality to an informational (digital) one. In this way, the 
precondition for “existence” is no longer immutability 
(as the Greeks believed) nor perception (as modern 
metaphysics contended), but interaction, regardless 
of tangibility (Floridi, 2010). Secondly, envelopment is 
blurring the distinction between offline and online 
environments. Reality is being progressively 
enhanced as our physical habitat merges with the 
abstract world of cyberspace. Finally, ICTs allow us 
to interact not only with other human agents, but also 
with “a-live” (artificially live) agents (Floridi, 2010), 
from ‘bots’ to a growing panoply of smart appliances. 
5 | DISCUSSION 
At the beginning of Section 4 we saw Gualeni claims 
the “core” of ICTs’ cultural impact is that they allow us 
to access different possible worlds, and that our 
exposure to digital simulations is fragmenting and 
expanding but not radically transforming our pre-
existing ontological frameworks. The argument being 
that, despite their objectified and otherworldly nature, 
virtual worlds are always designed for and 
experienced by human wetware. Hence, the 
ontologies they disclose are not (cannot be) radically 
different from those found in real life, only distorted 
versions of them. 
Given the previous assumptions, it is fair to ask what 




truly radical? Gualeni does not offer detailed criteria 
but he does mention that transcending traditional 
ontologies implies a change that is “alien and 
incompatible” (2015, p. 164) with every possible way 
in which humans experience the world. In other 
words, a radical alternative ontology should be utterly 
inapprehensible for a human mind, i.e. it should be a 
rationalisation of a worldview accessible only to some 
type of non-human “conscious exotica” (see 
Shanahan, 2016). 
Gualeni has set the bar high, but since the very 
definition of “human” is (and presumably will continue 
to be) an open question this leaves some room for 
ontological tinkering. ICTs will continue to allow us to 
simulate and experience even the most bizarre 
alternative worlds we can imagine, and with growing 
levels of fidelity, more so now that new generations of 
AR and VR technology are becoming available to 
more people. Furthermore, due to their informational 
nature, computational simulations are (at least 
theoretically) “permanently extendible” and “deeply 
remixable”, which means virtual worlds cannot only 
be expanded, updated, and rewritten, but also prone 
to “hybridising” (see Manovich, 2013). 
The higher the number of available virtual worlds, the 
more we can interact with them, and the larger the 
sources for imagining and constructing even stranger 
ontologies. Yet, granting the truth of Gualeni’s 
arguments, even the most exotic ontology we could 
devise would still be of human origin. It follows that 
while ICTs can indeed help us to imagine, tinker with, 
and experience alternative ways to be human, i.e. to 
serve as “technologies of the self”, they cannot 
otherwise assist us in transcending our humanity. 
The question is, whether ontological changes need to 
be “alien and incompatible” with pre-existing human 
frameworks in order to be truly revolutionary. 
Sometimes, seemingly small shifts can lead to long-
term, unpredictable, and radical changes, particularly 
when dealing with complex nonlinear systems. 
Arguably, our worldviews are not the sole product of 
our minds, as embodied creatures, our 
circumstances—as Ortega y Gasset (1966/1914) 
argued—also play a crucial role in informing our 
experience. Extrinsic changes (in our environment) 
affect us intrinsically; they reflect back onto our self-
understanding, and often in unpredictable ways. And 
ICTs, as Floridi showed, are doing precisely that: 
changing our environment in seemingly subtle and 
yet potentially radical ways. 
The envelopment of our physical reality, along with 
the ubiquity of computational appliances is turning the 
distinction between “onlife” and our Newtonian reality 
anachronistic. Cyberspace is no longer just an 
alternate world which we enter and exit at will, but 
which has gradually turned into a permanently 
available and (for some people) more socially active 
layer of our lives; an extension, of our existential 
reality. Whatever we do online can now directly 
influence our physical selves, and vice versa. What 
happens in virtual worlds does not stay in virtual 
worlds. By re-ontologising our environment, ICTs are 
indirectly shifting the “way we understand and 
rationally organise our experience of the world”; and 
in the process, they are also shaping our self-
conception. And yet, while this process is not as 
spectacular as what certain dystopias (e.g. Blade 
Runner, Neuromancer, The Matrix) have imagined, 
the ontological implications following them are in no 
way trivial. 
ICTs are allowing us for the first time in history to 
develop and interact with non-biological “smart” 
appliances [17] —“Intelligence” remains a strong 
word. However, regardless of how unsophisticated 
these technologies might still be, their role in human 
affairs is growing exponentially. Recent 
developments in machine learning, and particularly in 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), have made these 
systems better at guessing and influencing our 
wishes, recognising our faces, buying and selling 
stocks, helping to make healthcare decisions, etc. 
And while computational technology is indeed (as 
Gualeni claims) the materialisation of a particular 
form of human rationality and this would imply in 
principle that AI stands on the same ontological plane 
as human intelligence, reality is more nuanced. 
Specifications do not necessarily entail 
implementation, particularly when dealing with 
complex systems with multiple interdependencies. 
Problems such as (the lack of) interpretability (see 
Bornstein, 2016) of ANNs raise questions about the 
possibility of algorithmic thinking being similar, or 
even comparable to human thinking. The potential 
emergence of “strong” AI would arguably lead to a 
radical shift in the way we define being human. As it 
would not only mean that we would stop being the 
only intelligent agents on the planet (at least by 
 Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts, Volume 9, No. 3 – Special Issue: xCoAx 2017 
 CITARJ 
 53 
human standards), but that we might be dealing with 
potentially exotic intelligences. 
Yet, any argument concerning (strong) AI and its 
impact on human affairs is necessarily speculative. 
There is still an enormous gap between what we may 
call the “technoscientific reality” (or implementation) 
and philosophical thought experiments. The fact is, 
we do not know, nor can we predict how a given 
technology might affect (either positively or 
negatively) our existence both physically and 
ontologically. What we can do, as contemporary 
philosophers of technology and Foucault propose, is 
focus on how certain technologies influence specific 
practices and human contexts. 
6 | SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Much of what we are, or rather, of what our social 
selves are, has been incorporated into the 
“infosphere”. This has happened out of our own 
volition but also without our knowledge or consent. 
We all have some form of data trace; either directly or 
indirectly linked to us. Having a birth certificate or 
some other form of registry in a government 
institution, having a bank account, using the internet, 
owing and using a mobile phone, and so on and so 
forth; all of these things are part of our informational 
selves. Our social self is now more available, more 
interpretable, and more editable than ever. The life-
narratives of many people (whether accurate or not) 
stand one “googling” away. 
Our social selves are therefore permanently subject 
to change. We can edit, curate, and tinker with the 
information that is available about ourselves without 
major hacking skills. Whenever we access social 
platforms and interact with other people, whenever 
we add content to our personal websites, whenever 
we use the internet we are constructing and modifying 
our social selves. Who we are is also who we seem 
to be on Facebook, on Twitter, or any other platform. 
Tinkering means adjusting, changing, experimenting 
without doing so systematically. We tinker with our 
profiles, we choose and edit our selfies, we make 
opinions available. 
Although the techniques Foucault perhaps had in 
mind were employed by individuals living millennia 
ago, humans have never stopped seeking to enhance 
themselves. People today exercise power and control 
over themselves to develop more attractive bodies, to 
follow more healthy lifestyles, to live ethically, to be 
more productive, or even to transcend the limits of 
their human condition. Dietary fads and movements 
(from “good food” and craft beer to veganism and 
juicing), exercise routines (from yoga to CrossFit), 
productivity methods (from time-boxing to standing 
desks), mindfulness and meditation; all fit within 
Foucault’s original concept. We may even argue the 
current tendency of self-actualisation is returning to 
the classical principle of “taking care of one self”. 
What has changed are the specific reasons why 
human desire to transform themselves, along with the 
availability and the complexity of the tools designed 
to achieve it. Foucault’s concept is not only current, 
but can easily be employed to categorise the new 
generation of instruments and techniques of self-
transformation and enhancement. 
Yet, our current technologies of the self are not only 
those specifically designed for that purpose (i.e., 
wearables, tracking devices and services). As we saw 
in the previous discussion ICTs alone can have 
profound impact on the way humans present 
themselves to themselves. Physiologically speaking 
we might have not changed that much over the last 
two thousand years, but from a socio-cultural and 
technological standpoint the changes have been 
dramatic, particularly those that occurred within the 
last fifty years. By allowing us to interact with virtual 
worlds, ICTs have opened a whole new dimension in 
which we may speak of self-actualisation, more so 
when the things that happen in those virtual worlds 
have direct consequences on physical reality. Self-
enhancement is no longer carried out at physical or 
mental levels, but at informational levels too. 
The two analyses discussed in sections 4 are not 
incompatible, but they do differ in some important 
aspects. Both provide insightful reformulations of 
Foucault’s concept to address the cultural impact of 
ICTs. Some of the arguments underpinning Gualeni’s 
cautious assessment of the ontological impact of 
ICTs are debatable—particularly the one concerning 
the human imprint of computational technology—but 
his reinterpretation of self-fashioning as a poietic 
process is rather insightful. Particularly for the 
analysis of contemporary aesthetic practices 
involving radical body design and posthuman 
performance. Whereas Floridi’s framing of selfhood in 
terms of informational systems offers a non 
psychologistic explanation of how ICTs can meddle 
with our self-understanding. The notion that humans 




up to their mental states) is conceptually illuminating 
and methodologically valuable. In the end, it seems 
the tension between Floridi and Gualeni has more to 
do with the level of abstraction each of them is 
proceeding from. 
7 | CONCLUSIONS 
Foucault’s notion has acquired new meaning and 
relevance in the midst of the ongoing technological 
shifts. There are at least two senses in which we can 
speak of “technologies of the self”: Foucault’s original 
practice-oriented notion, and its contemporary 
materialisation. What in Foucault’s time were 
deliberate operations, in our current context are also 
the unintended consequences of our daily interaction 
with technology. ICTs are re-ontologising our context 
and therefore profoundly altering how we conceive 
and shape our sense of self. The introduction of these 
systems is ‘disruptive’ in positive and negative ways. 
ICTs can become potent agents of change within 
social and economic dynamics, but they can also 
bring unforeseeable  problems. Whether ICTs are 
ultimately changing what it means to be human 
remains an open question but meanwhile they are 
allowing us to tinker with our identities in ways that 
are truly unprecedented. 
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ENDNOTES 
[1] Tinkering is used here not in the (negative) sense 
of “meddling”, but rather in the sense of “adjust[ing], 
or work[ing] with something in an unskilled or 
experimental manner” (Merriam-Webster.com, 
2017). 
[2] An acronym for “Clustered Regularly Interspaced 
Short Palindromic Repeats”, CRISPR is a genomic 
feature that helps many species of bacteria to guard 
themselves against viruses (bacteriophagues). First 
noticed in the early 1990s (Greenwood, 2017), since 
the turn of the century CRISPR has led to various 
(controversial) techniques which “allow highly 
targeted editing of genomes” (Hsu, 2015), and thus 
the possibility of editing the genetic code of virtually 
any organism, including humans (Ledford, 2015). 
[3] For an entertaining summary of the current 
discussions concerning the impact of AI in human life 
see Ceglowski (2016). A more “academic” account 
can also be found in Floridi (2015). 
[4] Ratto’s own contribution to a critical reflection on 
the socio-cultural impact of technologies is what he 
calls “critical making” (see Ratto 2011), a 
constructionist-inspired practice that uses technical 
appliances as vehicles for scholarly reflection. 
[5] ANT may be seen as a form of relational ontology 
which characterises the world as a network of 
relations between human and non-human "actants", 
emphasising the mutual self-constitution of human 
beings and technological systems (see Rosenberger 
& Verbeek, 2015, pp. 19–32). 
[6] Oversimplifying, postphenomenology may be 
seen as a “hybrid”, pragmatic phenomenology; a 
“style” of philosophical analysis that focuses on 
human–technology relations (2009). 
[7] According to this view, there is not a single 
“technology”, but multiple technologies. Which means 
technologies are not intrinsically antithetical to the 
human spirit —as certain strains of critical theory 
sometimes imply, nor neutral, but necessarily defined 
by the circumstances and agents that use them. As 
Don Ihde puts it, “when divorced from human praxis” 
instruments are but “junk lying about” (cited in 
Verbeek, 2005, p. 117). 
[8] In this context, “ontology” means “a rationalisation 
of a particular worldview, a certain relationship 
established by a being with reality” (Gualeni, 2015, p. 
141). 
[9] That is why, from a phenomenological standpoint 
all technologies can —to a greater or lesser degree— 
be regarded as “technologies of the self”. 
[10] Gualeni points out that transformative 
experiences can also emerge accidentally from 
circumstances that were not deliberately intended to 
elicit them. 
[11] As described by Floridi (2011c, p. 14), the 
philosophy of information studies the life cycle, 
dynamics, and utilisation of information; and 
elaborates and applies information-theoretic 
methodologies to philosophical problems. 
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[12] Writing allowed humans to communicate 
diachronically across time and space (somebody’s 
thoughts could be read at a distance and through 
generations); electronic communication systems 
furthered the gap between presence and location by 
decoupling information from a physical medium 
(emails arrive instantly). 
[13] Systems that allow us to conceptualise, perceive 
and measure things that would otherwise remain 
hidden from the naked eye, including thermometers, 
microscopes, X-rays, fMRI, etc. 
[14] This is an “environment constituted by all 
informational entities (thus including informational 
agents as well), their properties, interactions, 
processes, and mutual relations” (Floridi, 2012, p. 
251). The “infosphere” is neither completely virtual, 
nor entirely physical; it harbours digital, as well as 
offline and analogue “spaces of information” (Floridi, 
2014, p. 59) and therefore it should not be confused 
with “cyberspace”, since this domain is only one of the 
infosphere's “subregions”. 
[15] As biological creatures, our capacity for adapting 
to changing environments is many orders of 
magnitude greater than that of (current) technological 
systems. For instance, regardless of how smart our 
most advanced machines might seem —e.g., neural 
networks, their ability to function remains 
overwhelmingly dependent on the contexts for which 
they were created. 
[16] An “envelop” or “reach envelop” is a term 
borrowed from robotics, and it refers to “the three-
dimensional space that defines the boundaries that 
the robot can reach” (Floridi, 2012, p. 251). 
[17] Surely humans have engaged in animism for 
thousands of years. But unless we believe in magic, 
it is difficult to concede that, for example, a 
(horseless) carriage might have transported its 
occupant for 32 km to receive a bloodletting, or that a 
medieval scholar could put out a candle by simply 
uttering a voice command. 
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